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There are not many among the married who can claim that their spouses have
remained the same as they were on their wedding day. Individuals marry and
subsequently discover new characteristics in their spouses. Some of these char-
acteristics may come as pleasant surprises; ﬁnding out that your spouse is an
excellent cook is one example. However, it is evident from the high rate of di-
vorce in many countries that many surprises are not as pleasant.
Because divorce can be psychologically painful and costly, some researchers
hypothesize that couples may choose to cohabit instead of marrying. Whether
cohabitation is a result of increased divorce rates is unclear; Waters and Ressler
(1999) study state level data on cohabitation and divorce and conclude that the
causality between divorce and cohabitation runs in both directions. What is
clear however, is that cohabitation as a life style has gained in popularity in
recent decades. This is particularly the case in North America and Europe. For
example, between the mid 1970s and the late 1980s the percentage of women aged
20-24 who were in cohabiting unions rose from 11% to 49% in France (Kiernan
1996).
Although prevalent, cohabitation is short-lived. It tends to precede marriage
rather than replace it. Bumpass and Sweet (1989) use data from the United
States and ﬁnd that 40% of all cohabiting couples either marry or stop living
together within a year, and only a third of cohabiting couples are still cohabiting
after two years. They also ﬁnd that 60% of those who marry after living in a
cohabiting union, marry their cohabiting partners. This is corroborated by more
recent data from the United Kingdom; Ermisch and Franscesconi (1999) also
ﬁnd that more than half of ﬁrst cohabiting unions are converted into marriage.
The most frequently cited reason for unmarried individuals living together is to
assess compatibility before marriage (Bumpass et al.1991). This indicates that
for many couples, cohabitation serves as a probationary period.
The goalof this paper is to devel op a theoreticalmodelconsistent with the
observed facts on cohabitation. As is evident from empiricalﬁndings, cohabita-
tion is often transitory and is often viewed as a kind of trialmarriage. It appears
to involve less commitment as cohabiting unions are more likely to dissolve than
marriages.
The model developed in this paper adopts the view that couples cohabit be-
cause they want to evaluate one another as potential spouses. They ﬁnd out each
others suitability as spouses while living together. Upon ﬁnding this out, they
either marry or separate. In addition, this study introduces imperfect informa-
tion, learning and relaxes the assumption of risk neutrality; a new feature in the
growing literature on two-sided matching models (see Burdett and Coles 1999 for
a survey). It extends Rao Sahib and Gu (2000), in which premaritalcohabitation
and subsequent marriage are investigated in a risk neutralsetting.
1The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
model. Section 3 describes the decision making of couples. The role of risk in
cohabiting and maritalunions is discussed in section 4. Section 5 shows that
cohabiting unions occur within classes and section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Search in the marriage market
2.1. The modelling framework
This subsection describes the modelling framework. It is a steady state matching
model with nontransferable utility and heterogeneous agents as developed in Bur-
dett and Coles (1997), hereafter simply BC. As our model is an extension of this
modeland we retain some of the terminol ogy used, we begin by ﬁrst describing
the BC model. We then describe how our model diﬀers from the BC model.
A modelof a decentral ized marriage market in which positive assortative
mating arises as an equilibrium outcome is developed in BC. The positive as-
sortative mating found in BC is in terms of a comprehensive index. This index,
termed pizazz, captures the worth of an individualas a marriage partner. If a
couple marry, they each receive as utility the pizazz of the other. Equilibrium
is characterized by a class partition. Men and women form classes with mar-
riages occurring only among members of the same class. There exists an ordering
among classes; men and women with high pizazz marry one another while men
and women with low pizazz marry one another. The type of assortative mating
found in BC is somewhat diﬀerent from the usualnotion of assortative mating
found in sociological and biosocial studies. In the latter, positive assortative mat-
ing refers to a positive correlation between the traits of couples, for example, a
positive correlation in age, education or height. Not all two-sided search mod-
els yield positive assortative mating as an equilibrium outcome; see for example,
Shimer and Smith (2000).
Narcissism is ruled out in the BC model. Having high pizazz is useful only
because it allows one to attract opposite sex individuals who also have high
pizazz, and increases the utility from marriage. The optimal policy for a single
individual to follow is to marry the ﬁrst single encountered of the opposite sex
whose pizazz is above a certain reservation level. The steady state is characterized
by a constant distribution of pizazz among the pool of single individuals and a
balanced ﬂow of market exits and entries.
In this paper, we deviate from the BC framework in four ways. First, BC
assume that an individual’s pizazz can be observed on contact. In their model,
individuals who ﬁnd a suitable spouse, marry and leave the marriage market for-
ever. In contrast, we assume that single individuals can observe the true pizazz of
a potential partner only imperfectly (we retain however, the term pizazz to mean
the worth of an individualas a marriage partner). This provides a motivation for
2cohabiting unions which are initiated by single men and women in an attempt
to learn each other’s true worth as marriage partners. Of course, cohabitation is
just one interpretation of this information collecting period; it can also be called
courtship or dating. Couples continue to cohabit until true pizazz is revealed,
and at that point, they either marry or separate1.
Second, in BC, individuals leave the marriage market through marriage or
death, and there is an exogenous in-ﬂow of new singles into the market. In
our model, however, cohabiting unions sometimes dissolve resulting in singles
re-entering the marriage market.
Third, it is assumed in BC that individuals are risk neutral. We relax the
assumption of risk neutrality and consider the case when individuals are risk
averse. This allows us to derive a general expression for the risk premium for
marriage over a cohabiting union.
Fourth, although it is not explicitly stated in BC, the distribution of oﬀers
of marriage from opposite-sex singles faced by an agent ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates the distribution faced by an agent from a lower pizazz class. This
continues to hold for the oﬀer distributions involved in our model. However, the
introduction of uncertainty and learning allows us to use the concept of second-
order stochastic dominance to analyze the role of risk in cohabiting and marital
unions.
We retain however, severalof the assumptions made in BC. We assume that
a large and equal number of male and female singles participate in a marriage
market. Although couples ﬁrst cohabit and then marry, we continue to refer to
this pool of singles as the marriage market. Clearly, as men and women either
cohabit or marry and leave the singles market, the distribution of pizazz will
change over time. However, we assume as in BC, that singles are only partially
rational and believe that the environment is stationary. This implies that they
believe that the distribution of pizazz in the singles market for both men and
women is constant over time. This is an important assumption as we assume
that individuals follow stationary strategies.
Individuals are assumed to adopt utility maximizing strategies given the be-
haviour of other singles in the market. In particular, it is assumed that partici-
pants in the marriage market seek to maximize the expected discounted lifetime
utility by searching for the best possible matches, discounted at a rate r to the
present. The optimal policy to be followed by individuals consists of a certain
set of opposite sex singles to whom they will make oﬀers of cohabitation if they
meet. Individual lifetimes follow an exponential distribution, and the probability
that an individualdies in time intervalof duration h is δh.
Pairs of market distributions of pizazz for men and women which are con-
1Chade (1999) also develops a model in which individuals observe one anothers’ type im-
perfectly. However, in his model, individuals never learn one others’ true type. After matching
on imperfectly observed type, they leave the market forever.
3sistent with ﬂow-in and ﬂow-out distributions that are equal, make up the set
of steady state equilibria. Our focus however, is on the decision problem faced
by couples rather than the calculation of steady state equilibria. In our model,
the calculation of the steady state is complicated by the fact that in addition to
outﬂows of singles due to marriage and death, cohabiting unions and marriages
may dissolve resulting in individuals re-entering the singles market.
We next describe our modelin which coupl es are assumed to ﬁrst cohabit and
then marry.
2.2. The model with cohabitation
We assume as it is often the case, that singles have diﬃculty contacting members
of the opposite sex and meet bilaterally (this is in contrast to Bloch and Ryder
2000 in which couples are matched via a centralized matching procedure). In
addition, a single who proposes to cohabit with a member of the opposite sex may
be rejected. To capture this uncertainty in initiating a cohabiting relationship, we
assume that for any single in the market, the rate at which oﬀers of cohabitation
arrive follows a Poisson process.
In the rest of the paper, we simplify exposition by considering the decision
maker to be a single woman who follows an optimal search strategy to ﬁnd a
potentialmarriage partner (the arguments are identicalfor the case of a singl e
man, and are dealt with by symmetry). We assume that when a woman meets
a man, she only observes his pizazz imperfectly. She observes y, though his true
pizazz is x. Symmetrically, the man also obtains a noisy observation y on the
woman’s pizazz x. We assume that singles believe that the distributions of both
true pizazz and observed pizazz are time-invariant. We refer to x as true pizazz
and y as observed pizazz.
The distribution of true pizazz among men is denoted GM (x). That is, if
a woman meets a man, then GM (x) is the probability that the man’s pizazz
is no greater than x, or alternatively, GM (x) may be used to denote the pro-
portion of men in the market whose pizazz is lower than x. Similarly, one can
deﬁne women’s pizazz distribution, denoted GW (x). For simplicity, we assume
GM (x)=GW (x)=G(x)=P (X ≤ x) with support [x,x]. In this sense, the
search-matching process is random.
We assume that observed pizazz is the sum of true pizazz and random noise.
That is, the woman observes y, a realization of Y , the random variable used to
denote observed pizazz. We assume that Y = X +ε and ε is independent of X.
Also, it is assumed that E (ε)=0a n dVa r(ε)i ss m a ll.
Upon observing y, the woman forms an expectation of the true pizazz of
the man, E(X | Y = y) denoted m(y)o rs i m p ly m (see the Appendix for an
example when there are two types of husbands). Although m is expected true
pizazz conditionalon observed pizazz, for the sake of brevity, we wil lrefer to m
4simply as expected pizazz. She then faces two choices. The ﬁrst is to enter into
a cohabiting union with him. The second is to remain single in the hope of a
better draw from the same distribution in the next period.
Here, m can be interpreted is the Bayes estimate of x, denoted   x.T h i s
estimate is obtained by minimizing a risk function: min  x Ex|y
1
2 (  x − x)
2.N o -
tice that this is the expectation of a quadratic loss function with respect to
the posterior distribution. For example, consider the case when X ∼ N (µ,σ2),
ε ∼ N (0,σ2
ε)a n dY = X+ ε with ε⊥X. Then,   x = m(y)=wµ +( 1− w)y
where w = σ2
ε/(σ2 + σ2
ε).
We make two assumptions. The ﬁrst (A1) is that m (y) > 0. This implies
that m is increasing in y. This captures the common view that ﬁrst impressions
matter. If a man looks like he would be a good husband, then the woman will
believe that he is likely to be a good husband. This assumption is satisﬁed in the
normaldistribution case mentioned above, as m  (y)=1− w>0.
Moreover, the assumption that m is increasing in y is usefulbecause m is




.D e n o t i n gt h e
distribution of M by F(m) we can write
F(m)=P (M ≤ m)=P (Y ≤ y (m)) = FY (y (m))
where y = y (m)is the inverse function of m = m(y).
Note that in this model, a single woman deciding whether or not to enter
a cohabiting relationship has two pieces of information available to her. One is
the observed pizazz of a potentialpartner y. The other is her knowledge of the
distribution of true pizazz conditionalon observed pizazz (more detail s about
this distribution may be found in note 2 of the Appendix). This distribution is
denoted distribution is QX|Y(x | y)=P(X ≤ x | Y = y).
Using these two pieces of information, she calculates m(y). All decisions re-
garding whether or not to enter a cohabiting relationship or stay in one are based
on m. By basing inference on m instead of y, the woman increases the preci-
sion of her inference about true pizazz. For the case of the normaldistribution
mentioned above, M ∼ N (µ,σ2
m)w h e r eσ2









y = σ2 + σ2
ε. Also, notice that σ2
m|x which is (1 − w)
2 σ2




In addition, a woman’s own attractiveness, captured by her pizazz, determines
the pizazz and the number of men that she can attract. That is, women with
high pizazz are able to attract men who also have high pizazz. However, a woman
who has high worth as marriage partner may not appear to have high worth as a
marriage partner. This depends on the distribution of true pizazz conditionalon
observed pizazz. A woman may have a ‘bad’ day, and appear less attractive than
5she really is. That is, her observed pizazz, y is equalto the sum of x and a large
negative draw from the noise distribution. Alternatively, a woman who has low
pizazz may be lucky and appear more attractive than she really is. Given that y is
an imperfect indicator of true pizazz, one could ask if a possible strategy may be
for the woman to simply state her true pizazz, when she meets a man. However,
men who encounter a woman are more likely to trust their own judgment than
the pizazz stated by the woman. They trust their own estimate of her true
pizazz based on observed pizazz. As a result, as true pizazz is revealed only at
some moment in cohabitation, what aﬀects a woman’s cohabitation prospects are
estimates of her true pizazz based on observed pizazz, m = E(X | Y = y).
Notice however, that a woman’s m is random from her own point of view.
She does not know the realization of observed pizazz that will occur when she
encounters a man. However, the expected discounted utility of rejecting an oﬀer
of cohabitation and continuing to be single denoted R, is constant in search
models of this type. Therefore, as m is stochastic, we parameterize R by   me
instead of parameterizing it with m. Here,   me is the woman’s expectation of her
m conditionalon her private knowl edge of her own true pizazz, x. We refer to
this woman as an   me-type woman. That is,   me = E(m(y) | x)=Eε(m(x + ε)).
In the case of the normaldistribution,   me = wµ +( 1− w)x. Notice that this
is a weighted average of two quantities. The ﬁrst quantity is her true type, x.
The second quantity is her estimate of the estimate made by the man she meets,
which is µ. In this expression, µ = E(M)=E(E(X | Y )) = E(X).
There exists a set of men who are willing to cohabit with a   me-type woman.
We denote the distribution of m among such men by F (m |   me). As m is in-
vertible, the conditional distribution QX|Y(x | y) may be expressed in terms of
m, and can be written as Q(x,m)o rm o r ep r e c i s e lya s Q(x,m |   me). This is the
distribution of true pizazz x conditionalon observed pizazz y = y(m) among men
who are willing to cohabit with a woman with conditional expected pizazz   me.
We denote by α the totalarrivalrate of oﬀers of cohabitation from al lmen
faced by a particular woman. As men and women face diﬀerent opportunities
based on their attractiveness, a fraction of these oﬀers, denoted α(  me) are re-
c e i v e db yaw o m a nw i t h  me,a n dα(  me) ≤ α.
As cohabiting unions are initiated based on a noisy signalof an individual ’s
worth as a marriage partner, some cohabiting unions progress to marriage when
couples discover each other’s true worth as marriage partners while others dis-
solve. We assume that the rate at which cohabiting unions evolve into marriage
also follows a Poisson process with rate λ. This transition to marriage is also
related to a woman’s type and the rate faced by a   me-type woman is written
as λ(  me). Those women who are more attractive are more likely to transit to
marriage. Those who are less attractive are more likely to have their cohabiting
unions dissolve so that they must return to the singles pool.
The second assumption (A2) we make concerns Q(x,m |   me). We assume that
6∂Q(x,m |   me)/∂m < 0. This assumption implies that for any given mB <m A
we have Q(x,mA |   me) <Q (x,mB |   me) for all x ∈ SX.T h a ti s ,Q(x,mA |   me)
ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Q(x,mB |   me). Recall that a distribution
function:
F(x) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates G(x)i f
F(x) ≤ G(x) for all x. (1)
In addition, if F(x) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates G(x), then for a non-
decreasing function u(x), we have
EG(x)u(x) <E F(x)u(x)( 2 )
For example, suppose that a single woman encounters two single men, denoted
A and B with observed pizazz yA and yB respectively. Assume that man A
appears to be the better partner than man B.T h a ti s ,yB <y A.S i n c ew eh a v e
assumed that m (y) > 0, this implies that mB <m A. The assumption of ﬁrst
order stochastic dominance implies the following: for any value of true pizazz x,
the probability that the true pizazz of man A is more than x is greater than the
probability that the true pizazz of man B is more than x.
This holds in the case of the normal distribution mentioned above. In this
case,








where φ(·) is the standard normaldensity. Recal lthat ( X | y) ∼ N (m,σ2
1)w h e r e
σ2
1 = wσ2 and w = σ2
ε/(σ2 + σ2
ε).
We can consider the matching process leading to marriage as occurring in
three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, which can be regarded as a “pre-draw” stage,
a single individual is in the marriage market. In this stage, she only knows the
distribution of expected true pizazz conditionalon observed pizazz, F(m).
In the second stage, the woman draws x (a draw from the distribution of true
pizazz) but observes y (a draw from the distribution of observed pizazz). She
chooses to cohabit with him if his value of m (her inference of his true pizazz
based on y) exceeds a certain threshold level, denoted mr. This threshold level,
mr is her reservation level of expected true pizazz conditional on observed pizazz.
If she enters a cohabiting union with a man with expected pizazz m, she receives
utility equal to u(m) during that period. If not, she remains single and the
process repeats itself in the next period. It is of course possible that she herself
is rejected by the man she has encountered, in which case she has no choice but
to remain single until the next period.
Sometime during the cohabitation period, the true pizazz of each partner is
revealed to the other. This marks the third stage. We assume for simplicity that
learning occurs only once and only during cohabitation. At this point, each party
7must decide whether to maintain or quit the current match. If the couple choose
to maintain the match, they are assumed to establish a formal marriage and leave
the marriage forever. If the cohabiting couple do not to marry, they are assumed
to separate.
This distinction is made only to aid understanding. Events in fact occur at
random intervals, because of the Poisson assumption that underlies the processes
of cohabitation and marriage. The next section devel ops the formalmodelfurther
in terms of these three stages. The optimal policy to be followed in each stage is
derived and for ease of exposition, we continue to assume that the decision maker
is a woman.
3. The decision making process
3.1. Stage 1: being single
This is the “pre-draw” stage, when a   me-type woman is in the singles market.
At this stage, she observes neither x nor y. She only knows F(m), the distribu-










In the above, R(  me) is the expected discounted utility of being single in the
current period and following an optimal policy from the next period onward.
The term u  me (0) is the utility received in the current period. This term is in
fact, u  me (m)w h e r em is the expected pizazz of her cohabiting partner. However,
she has no partner at this stage and therefore the argument of u  me (·) is zero. The
term α(  me)h is the probability that the woman receives an oﬀer of cohabitation
during the short time interval h. The expected discounted value of having an
oﬀer from an m-type man is denoted EmV  me (m). An m-type man is one whose
expected true pizazz conditionalon observed pizazz is m. The term, 1−α(  me)h
is the probability that no oﬀer of cohabitation is received in the time period h.
In this case, the woman has no choice but to remain single till the next period.
We assume for now that u  me (m)=m. Letting h → 0, we have o(h)/h → 0
and we can rewrite (3) to obtain
R(  me)=
α(  me)
r + α(  me)
EmV  me (m). (4)
A reservation pizazz policy is the optimal policy to be followed in this stage; this
is demonstrated in section 3.4.
83.2. Stage 2: should we live together?
At this stage, the woman encounters a man and based on his observed pizazz,
estimates his true pizazz. That is, she calculates E(X | Y = y)o rs i m p ly m.T h e
woman is confronted with two alternatives: continue to be single or enter into a
cohabiting union with the man she has encountered. The value function at this
stage is:
V  me (m)=m a x
 
ϕ  me (m),R(  me)
 
. (5)
In the above expression, ϕ  me (m) is the expected discounted utility of accepting
an oﬀer of cohabitation from an m-type man and behaving optimally from the
next period onwards. This term can be written as follows:








The ﬁrst term u(m)h is the utility received in the short time interval h of being
in a cohabiting union with a man with expected pizazz equalto m. The term
λ(  me)h is the probability that the woman receiving a proposal for marriage
from her cohabiting partner in time interval h. The value of receiving an oﬀer of
marriage and behaving optimally next period onwards is denoted J  me (x). Notice
that the expectation of this value function is taken with respect to x conditional
on m. In the event that no oﬀer of marriage is received during time interval h,a n d
this occurs with probability (1 − λ(  me)h), the woman remains in a cohabiting
relationship. We continue to assume that u  me (m)=m. Then, as h → 0( ??)
reduces to
ϕ  me (m)=
m + λ(  me)Ex|mJ  me (x)
r + λ(  me)
. (7)
It should be pointed out that there is no uncertainty about true pizazz being
revealed at some moment during cohabitation. When this occurs, couples either
marry or separate. However, the optimal policy to be followed is determined ex-
ante, before any oﬀers of marriage are made. Therefore, we need to introduce the
Poisson parameter λ(  me), which links the cohabitation stage and the marriage
stage of the model. The optimal policy to be followed in this stage is also derived
in section 3.4.
3.3. Stage 3: should we marry?
Stage 3 is when the woman ﬁnds out the true pizazz, x, of her cohabiting part-
ner. She then chooses to either separate from him or marry him. Assuming that
the woman receives as utility, the true pizazz of her husband in each time pe-
riod following marriage, that is u  me (x)=x, then the utility from marriage is
ψ  me (x)=x/r = ψ (x). This is based on the assumption that once a couple
marry, they stay married forever and never return to the singles market. If the
9woman does not marry, she returns to the singles market and the expected dis-
counted utility she receives is then R(  me), as discussed in stage 1. Therefore,
the value function at this stage can be written as
J  me (x)=m a x
 
ψ  me (x),R(  me)
 
(8)
The optimal strategy to be followed at this stage is a reservation pizazz policy.
The woman marries her cohabiting partner if his true pizazz, x ≥ xr where
xr = rR(  me)=ψ
−1 (R(  me)). (9)
In the above equation, xr is the woman’s minimum acceptable level of pizazz.
This result depends on the constancy of R(  me) w.r.t. x which is shown next.
3.4. Derivation of optimal strategies.
We ﬁrst show that the optimal strategy to be followed in stage 2 is a reservation
pizazz strategy. To show this, we ﬁrst demonstrate that ϕ  me (m) is strictly in-
creasing in m. To this end, we ﬁrst examine the expectation of value function in
stage 3. This is:
EJx|m (x)=Ex|m max
 
ψ  me (x),R(  me)
 
. (10)
Evaluating the above expression (see the Appendix for details) yields:





[1 − Q(x,m |   me)]dx + R(  me) (11)
which is a function of (m,   me). Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. m we obtain,









∂Q(x,m |   me)
∂m
 
dx > 0 (12)
because of assumption A2.
This allows for an additional interpretation of assumption A2. Notice from
(10) that J  me (x) is nondecreasing in x. Using EQ (·) to denote the expectation
taken using distribution Q, we can write
EQ(x,mB|  me)J  me (x) <E Q(x,mA|  me)J  me (x) (13)
as Q(x,mA |   me) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Q(x,mB |   me). The in-
equality in (13) can clearly be seen to hold by examining (11). This may be
10explained as follows: Suppose that a woman cohabits with a man with condi-
tionalmean pizazz mA as opposed to cohabiting with a man with conditional
mean pizazz mB and that mB <m A. Then the woman’s expected discounted
utility of following an optimal strategy when the true pizazz of her cohabiting
partner is revealed is higher in the case of man A than it is in the case of man B.
The assumption that ∂Q(x,m |   me)/∂m < 0 is important in terms of the
mathematics of the model. Next, it is used in proving that ϕ  me(m)i si n c r e a s i n gi n
m. Recall that ϕ  me(m) is the expected discounted utility of being in a cohabiting
union in the current period and following an optimal strategy from the next
period onward. Diﬀerentiating (7):




r + λ(  me)
 
1+λ(  me)




Substituting (12) in the above yields:






















because of assumption A2. This ensures that a unique solution to the stage-2
problem exists. The optimal strategy to be followed in stage 2 is also a reservation
pizazz policy. An   me-type woman cohabits with a man if his estimated pizazz
m ≥ mr where mr = ϕ
−1
  me (R(  me)).
To solve for the rejection utility for stage 1, we ﬁrst evaluate the expectation
of (5), which can be written as follows
EV  me (m)=EM max
 
ϕ  me (m),R(  me)
 
. (16)
Evaluating the above (see the Appendix for the derivation of the following equa-
tion), yields the rejection utility for this   me-type woman:
R(  me)=
α(  me)
r(r + λ(  me))
m  
ϕ−1
  me(R(  me))

















Notice that from the above equation, it is clear that R(  me) does not depend on
particular values of x or m. This constancy is important in establishing that a
reservation strategy is optimalin stages 2 and 3.
11Blackwell’s theorem (see Sargent 1987) ensures that there exists a unique solu-




  me (R(  me)),m
 
.
By symmetry, we will have another functional equation in R(me) for an me-type
man as the decision-maker, which is identicalto (17) except that me and   me
are exchanged. The assumption that men and women face the same underlying
distribution, that is GM (x)=GW (x) allows us to use the symmetry argument.
These two equations are used to derive the results on class partitioning which
will be discussed in the next section.
Since the rest of the paper deals with matching and class partitions, we simply
denote the type of the decision maker as   me. The type of the potentialpartners
of this decision maker is denoted me. As long as a sorting result is attained for
one sex, the same can be derived for the other sex by symmetry. This symmetric
equilibrium induces sorting of individuals at the aggregate level.
4. Stochastic dominance and the class partition
In this section, we show that cohabiting unions occur only between couples in the
same class and that there is an ordering among classes. The number of classes is
ﬁnite. We prove these results by establishing a series of lemmas.
Lemma 1. During the search for a cohabiting partner, the distribution of m
among opposite-sex singles faced by a   me-type single ﬁrst-order stochastically
dominates the distribution of m among opposite sex singles faced by an     me-type
single if     me <   me.T h a ti s ,F (m |   me) <F
 
m |     me
 
.
Proof: In what follows, m  denotes the upper bound of the distribution of   Me.
F (m |   me)=P
 
M ≤ m |   Me ≤ m
 
 
= P (M ≤ m | M ≤ m
 )
= F (m)/F (m
 ), for m ≤ m ≤ m
 ,a n d  me ≤ m
 
In the above, we substitute m  in place of the conditioning variable   me; m  will
in fact be determined later in the matching process. We can replace   Me by M
because we assume that beliefs are rational and because the distribution of pizazz
is the same for both men and women. Notice that F (m |   me) is a truncated
distribution with truncated support [m,m  ]. As   me decreases, its upper bound
may or may not fall and the resultant support will shrink if the bound does
fall, thus generating a series of truncated distributions. Because F (m |   me) <
F
 
m |     me
 
for     me ≤ m  ,   me ≤ m  and m   <m  , we have the result that
F (m |   me) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates F
 
m |     me
 
.
Lemma 2. A cohabiting individual with expected pizazz (  me)of either sex is
more likely to attract a spouse of higher true pizazz than a cohabiting individual
with lower expected pizazz     me.
12Proof: No truncation is required in this case, instead we simply specify the
following:
Q(x,m |   me)=Q(x,m) for m ≤ m
  and ∀x ∈ [x,x],where   me ≤ m
 
In this case, the support for the conditionaldistribution does not shrink. How-
ever, it is the upper bound m  of the parameterizing variable   me that deﬁnes the
range of m. The cohabitor’s m has the same upper bound as the decision-maker.
The stochastic dominance property still holds, as desired. For example, if     me
≤ m  ,   me ≤ m , m   <m  ,a n di f    me <   me, then it follows from assumption A2
that the family of distributions Q(x,m |   me) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates
that of distributions Q
 
x,m |     me
 
.
Lemma 3. A higher-type individual of either sex faces a higher arrival rate both
of oﬀers of cohabitation and of oﬀers of marriage than his or her competitors of
lower types.
Proof: α(  me)=αF (m ) for   me ≤ m ,w h i c hs a y st h a tα(  me) is calculated by
discounting the overall arrival rate of cohabitation oﬀers α at a rate of [1−F (m )]
because with such a probability no opposite-sex singles with type m greater than
m  are willing to propose to a   me-type person for cohabitation. By the same
logic, the arrival rate of marriage oﬀers faced by either sex must undergo the
discounting procedure such as: λ(  me)=λF (m ) for   me ≤ m .
Notice that these lemmas already contain some of the elements related to
class partitioning. Singles are better oﬀ proposing to opposite sex singles of
either the same type as themselves or of a lower type. However, the lower bound
of preferences of singles is not yet clear. These lemmas are concerned only with
the upper bound of compatible partners’ pizazz levels. Further results based on
reservation pizazz policies are needed to identify lower bounds of pizazz intervals
within which couples can be matched.
Lemma 1 may be interpreted as deﬁning the opportunity set for a person
of type   me,[ m,m  ] ≡ Mopp. Any opposite-sex single with m higher than m 
is unattainable. The reservation pizazz policy derived from the search model
determines the acceptance set [mr,m] ≡ Macc for this person. Any opposite-sex
below the lower bound mr is considered unacceptable. Then, the intersection
of the two sets, Mopp ∩ Macc, identiﬁes the set of opposite-sex partners that are
both attainable and acceptable to this person. This is a set of mutually agreeable
pizazz types. Note that the reservation demand of opposite-sex singles determines
the upper bound of this set while the single’s own reservation demand decides its
lower bound.
Lemma 4. The best single of either sex accepts any opposite sex single in the
top class. That is, the single whose   me = m will cohabit with a member of the
opposite sex with m ∈ (m1,m] and marry a member of the opposite sex with x
∈ (x1,x].
13Proof: Consider the case of the woman whose   me = m whom we refer to as
the best woman. Using lemmas 1, 2 and 3, we can show that F (m | m)=F (m),
Q(x,m | m)=Q(x,m), for m ∈ [m,m],x∈ [x,x], and α(m)=α, λ(m)=λ.
From this and from (17), we ﬁnd that the expected discounted utility of being























Solving this equation for R determines the best single’s reservation demand for












We have now established that the best woman will cohabit with men whose
m ∈ (m1,m] and marry men with x ∈ (x1,x]. We refer to men whose m ∈ (m1,m]
as making up the top class for cohabiting unions and men whose x ∈ (x1,x]a s
making up the top class for marital unions. By symmetry, the top-class of women
can also be deﬁned. Notice that the best man will not necessarily cohabit or marry
the best woman. This is the outcome of a positive discount rate and the diﬃculty
in encountering singles of the opposite sex.
Lemma 5. A top-class single of either sex cohabits and marries any top-class
single of the opposite sex.
Proof: This is a natural corollary of lemma 4, can be proved rigorously as fol-
lows. As we have shown that the best man will accept any woman in the top-class
as a partner, all men must be willing to accept women in the top class as part-
ners. This implies that any woman with   me ∈ (m1,m) faces the same prospects
as the best woman. She faces the entire distribution of pizazz among men and the
totalarrivalrate of oﬀers from al lmen. Therefore, for such women, F (m |   me)
= F (m), Q(x,m |   me)=Q(x,m), for m ∈ [m,m], x ∈ [x,x], and α(  me)=α,
λ(  me)=λ. Substituting these quantities into (17) yields the expected discounted






  me(R(  me))















Equations 7 and 11 and lemmas 2 and 3 imply ϕ
−1
  me (·)=ϕ
−1
m (·). Notice that (19)
and (18) are identicalexcept that the term R(m) appears in (18) while the term
R(  me) appears in (19). Therefore, R(  me)=R for   me ∈ (m1,m]. Therefore, the
reservation values of women in the top class other than the best woman, mr (  me)
and xr (  me), are identicalto the reservation val ues of the best woman: m1 and
x1, respectively.
14Lemma 6. A second-class single of either sex accepts any second-class single of
the opposite sex. That is singles with m ∈ (m2,m 1] cohabit with each other while
couples with whose x ∈ (x2,x 1] marry each other.
Proof: Consider a woman who is not in the top class but she is the best
among all women who are not in the top class. That is, her   me = m1.T h i s
woman will be rejected by all men in the top class, but she is the most attractive
among women not in the top class. From lemma 1, 2 and 3, she faces F (m | m1)
= F (m)/F (m1), Q(x,m | m1)=Q(x,m), for m ∈ [m,m 1], x ∈ [x,x], and
α(m1)=αF (m1), λ(m1)=λF (m1). Using these results, and applying (17)
to the shrunk support [m,m 1] results in the expected discounted utility of being
single for this woman:
R1 ≡ R(m1)=
α


















Solving the above for R1 identiﬁes the men that form the second-class: m ∈
(m2,m 1], x ∈ (x2,x 1], where m2 = ϕ−1
m1 (R1), x2 = ψ−1 (R1). By symmetry, one
can also obtain the second-class of women. By the same reasoning as in the proof
of lemma 5, we have R(  me)=R1 for   me ∈ (m2,m 1], and lemma 6 then follows.
Proposition 1 Singles in class-i only accept opposite-sex singles in the same
class, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,w h e r en is a ﬁnite number.
Proof: Repeating the procedures in lemma 4, 5, 6, and applying mathematical
induction, one can conclude that R(  me) is a non-decreasing step function so that
Rn−1 < ···<R 1 < R. Class partitioning is such that (m <)mn < ···<m 1 < m
and (x <)xn < ···<x 1 < x. It can be proved by contradiction that n is ﬁnite.
The proof is identicalto the one in BC in which the number of cl asses that make
up the class partition for marriage is shown to be ﬁnite.
The implications of this theorem are as follows: (1) singles can be split up
into n distinct classes. In equilibrium, matches, either cohabiting or marital, take
place only between the two sexes in the same class; (2) the class partition for mar-
riage is consistent with that of cohabitation; (3) the aggregate matching induced
by class partitioning is not Pareto optimal due to imperfect information. That
is, a low-type single can increase her welfare through mismatch in cohabitation
and this can be achieved by mis-signalling at the partner’s expense. A cohabitor
of higher type will suﬀer from a utility loss in comparison to what she could
get when matched with a partner of the same class under perfect information.
What is more, she faces the prospect of re-entering the marriage market after
15the relationship dissolves. The next section addresses the issue of risk in greater
detail.
5. Risk premia, cohabitation and marriage
This section addresses issues related to the risk of mis-match and the risk aversion
of the individual. For simplicity, we omit the conditioning variable   me in what
follows. The results are obtained by linking the agent’s optimal policies in stages
2 and 3. We begin with the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Individuals are more discriminating when they marry than when
they cohabit. That is, reservation values for potential spouses are higher than
reservation values for potential cohabiting partners.
Proof: If we consider a woman in the top class, then her   me ∈ [m1,m]a n dR(  me)
= R. If we write mr in place m1 and xr in place of x1 to emphasize that these
are reservation cut-oﬀ levels, then ϕ  m (mr)=R and ψ (xr)=R. Therefore, from
(7) we have,
R =
mr + λEx|m=mrJ (x)
r + λ
(21)
Using Rr = xr and rearranging terms yields,
λ
 
Ex|m=mrJ (x) − R
 
= xr − mr.
Using (34) from the Appendix we have,




  x  
xr
(x − xr)dQ(x,mr) > 0. (22)
The above equation holds not just for the top class, but for any class2.N o t i c e
that (22) has two interpretations. The ﬁrst is an interpretation similar to the one
found in the search literature on the costs and beneﬁts of search. The left hand
side represents the opportunity cost of searching one more time with a marriage
proposalof xr at hand. The right hand side represents the prospective beneﬁt
of this search which is the expected discounted utility associated with a future
draw of x>x r. Individuals set lower reservation levels for cohabitation than for
2The general relation related to (22) for class i or   me ∈ (mi,m i−1] should take the form of






Since Q(x,m |   me)=Q(x,m)f o r∀ m ≤ mi−1 accordingto lemma 2, evaluatingthis at m
= mi yields Q(x,mi |   me)=Q(x,mi).
16marriage because observed pizazz is a noisy signalof true pizazz. As cohabitation
unions precede marriage, individuals may miss out on the right husband or wife
by setting reservation levels for cohabitation too high.
A second interpretation is based on a comparison of the distributions F (m)
and G(x) and noting that F (m) second-order stochastically dominates G(x).
That is, G(x)i sr i s k i e rt h a nF (m). Recall that G(x) is the distribution of true
pizazz while F (m) is the distribution of expected pizazz. Before a single indi-
vidual receives any oﬀers, there are only two pieces of information available: the
individual’s prior distributions of G(x)a n dF (m). Based on this, the individual
has to make an ex-ante decision on the optimal policy to be followed when cohab-
iting or marrying. For example, in the normal distribution case, it can be shown
that G(x) is just a mean-preserving spread of F (m)s i n c eµm = µx and σ2
m <σ 2
x.
Since the distributions have equalmeans, the individual ’s response when facing
the riskier distribution G(x), is to become more choosy. The term RP can be
interpreted as a kind of risk premium that compensates the individualfor the
higher risk in marriage versus cohabitation.
Proposition 3 Higher reservation values for cohabitation translate into higher
reservation values for marriage. Consider two individuals indexed i, i = k and










Proof: Combining the optimalsearch pol icies in stage 2 and 3 we have, xr = rR
= rϕ(mr). Using (14), we have dxr/dmr = rϕ  (mr) > 0.
Proposition 4 Individuals who set higher reservation values for cohabitation are
more risk averse than others. That is,
RP








dx ≥ P (x ≥ xr | m = mr)







The above derivation uses (22) as an implicit function: x = x(m). This proposi-
tion asserts that the risk premium rises with the level of reservation cohabitation
pizazz, provided that the probability that the partner satisﬁes the individual’s
reservation demand is lower than the degree of stochastic dominance.
Proposition 5 For any individual in any class, the risk premium to compensate
for the higher risk of marriage over cohabitation is equal to the quantity of risk
multiplied by its price.
17Proof: Re-writing (22) to its equivalent:
xr − mr = P (x<x r | m = mr)E [ξ (xr − x) | x<x r,m= mr] (24)
In the above, the quantity of risk3, P (x<x r | m = mr), is the probability that
the true pizazz of the cohabiting partner turns out to be below the woman’s
reservation cut-oﬀ for marriage even though he was acceptable as a cohabiting
partner. The ‘price’ of this risk is the expectation of ξ (xr − x), conditionalon
this disappointing revelation. The term ξ =( 1+r/λ)
−1 < 1 is the multiplier
in the measurement of the risk. The higher the discount rate r, and the lower
the transition rate λ of cohabitation to marriage, the smaller is the eﬀect of this
multiplier on the price of risk. The term, (xr − mr), is the loss in utility compared
with what the woman would have gained had she chosen a partner with x>x r
as well as m ≥ mr (that is, if the woman had chosen a man who was both a good
cohabiting partner as well as a good husband).
So far, individuals are assumed to be risk neutral. We now relax this as-
sumption. Note however, that relaxing this assumption does not alter the results
obtained in the last section.
Proposition 6: For a risk averse individual, the total risk premium can be
decomposed into two parts. One is (xr − mr), this compensates the individual for
bearing the risk due to the second-order stochastic dominance of F (m) over G(x);
the other part is ξRPpa which is a function of the individual’s risk aversion.
Proof: We assume that the individual’s utility function u(x), possesses the usual
properties of being strictly increasing and concave. Therefore, (22) can then be
3Stringently, the quantity of risk for class i should be measured as
P (x<x i | mi ≤ m<m i−1)=
xi  
−∞
f (x | yi ≤ y<y i−1)dx
using y  (m) > 0. In addition,







and the price of risk for this class is ξ multiplied by











However less stringently, one can condition on m = mr in (24) in addressingthe issue of
mismatch risk. This is the risk that the current partner is only good enough as a cohabitor







[u(x) − u(xr)]dxQ(x,mr) > 0 (25)
Since the utility function is assumed to be increasing, we have u(xr) >u(mr).
The application of Jensen’s inequality to the above equation yields
u(xr) − u(mr) <P(x<x r | m = mr)E [ξ (u(xr) − u(x)) | x<x r,m= mr]
We can consider x as mr plus an actuarially neutral gamble of z (= x−mr)i nt h e
sense that Ex|mrz = 0. Taking the second order Taylor series expansion of u(x)
around mr, the ﬁrst-order expansion of u(xr) around mr, and using the Arrow-
Pratt measure of local risk premium (see chapter 4 of Copeland and Weston 1979
for a derivation) yields:
RPpa = −
 
σ2 (z | mr)
2
 
u   (mr)
u  (mr)
> 0
Here RPpa captures the diﬀerence between the quantities on both sides of Jensen’s
inequality or the degree of the agent’s risk aversion if the risk in question is not
too large. Mathematical manipulation yields














σ2 (z | x>x r,m= mr)
2
u   (mr)
u  (mr)
.
Taking the Taylor series expansions once again gives
xr − mr + ξRP
M
pa = P (x<x r | m = mr)E [ξ (xr − x) | x<x r,m= mr] (26)
which reduces to (24) if u   =0 . This result however depends on the assumption
that σ2
ε is small enough so that the quantity of risk is not very large, and the
Arrow-Pratt approximation may be used.
6. Conclusion
Marriages today are commonly preceded by a period of cohabitation. For many
couples, this period of cohabitation serves as a trial marriage. It is a period in
which they can decide if their cohabiting partner is the right choice as a spouse.
19Despite a vast empirical literature, mainly in demography, there are few theo-
reticalmodel s that can be used to study the modern phenomenon of cohabitation
followed by marriage. This paper develops such a model. The framework used is
a two sided search-matching model. To this framework, the paper adds imperfect
information, learning and risk; new concepts in the search-matching literature.
This extended modelis consistent with empiricalﬁndings from demographic stud-
ies on cohabitation and marriage.
20Appendix
Note 1: The calculation of m(y) when there are two types of husbands.
This note gives an example of the case when husbands are of two types: good and
bad. Denote the type of the husband by the random variable X. Assume that X
takes on two possible values xG and xB with probability p and 1−p respectively.
Good husbands are men who have pizazz xG, while bad husbands are men who
have pizazz xB.
In addition, when a woman meets a man, he can either appear to be a good
husband or appear to be a bad husband. That is, his observed pizazz, y is a
realization of the random variable Y , and can take on one of two values, yg or
yb. Those that seem like good husbands have observed pizazz yg while those that
seem like bad husbands have observed pizazz have yb. However, appearances are
not always to be trusted, as some bad husbands may appear to be good husbands
and vice versa.
The discrete (two-type) counterpart of m(y)i sxGP (xG | y)+xBP (xB | y).
A woman then infers her partner’s true type x from his signal y according to
Bayes’ law:
P (xG | y)=
P (y | xG)p
P (y | xG)p + P (y | xB)(1− p)
Notice that P (xB | y)=1−P (xG | y).
Let α = P (yg | xG). Note that α is the probability that a good husband
looks like a good husband (he correctly signals his type). Then, the posterior
probability that a man is a good husband given that he looks like a good husband,
is
P (xG | yg)=
αp
αp +( 1− α)(1− p)
which is positively related to α and p.
For comparison, the continuous counterpart of [P (xG | y),P(xB | y)] is f (x | y)
= f (y | x)fX (x)/fY (y). The continuous counterpart to (α,1 − α)i sf (y | x).
Note 2: The joint distribution of observed and true pizazz.
Suppose that the joint density of true pizazz, X and observed pizazz, Y is denoted
fX,Y(x,y). The distribution of true pizazz conditionalon observed pizazz is:






The expectation of true pizazz conditionalon observed pizazz denoted m(y)c a n
be written as
m(y)=E(X | Y = y)=
  x
x






21Since m is increasing in y, the support of m is [m,m]=[ m(y),m(y)]. It is
then legitimate to invert the function m, denoted y(m). The distribution of the
random variable M = E(X | Y )i sg i v e nb y







QX|Y(x | y)=QX|Y(x | y(m)) ≡ Q(x,m), (30)
with domain SX × SM where SX =[ x,x]a n dSM =[ m,m].
Derivation of (11).
The expectation of the value function in stage 3 ((10)) is
Ex|mJ = Ex|m max
 
ψ  me (x),R(  me)
 
.
Recall that in the above, the decision maker is a woman. Her expected true
pizazz conditionalon observed pizazz (based on her private knowl edge of her
own x) is denoted   me. The true pizazz of the potentialhusband is denoted x
and his expected true pizazz conditionalon his observed pizazz y, is denoted m.
Expanding the above, we obtain,
Ex|mJ =P r ( ψ  me (x) ≥ R(  me))Ex|m
 





Pr(ψ  me (x) <R (  me))
 
R(  me).
The policy to be followed by the woman is to marry her cohabiting partner if
his true pizazz, x is greater than a threshold level, xr. That is, Pr(ψ  me (x) ≥
R(  me)) = Pr(x ≥ xr) and Pr(ψ  me (x) <R (  me)) = Pr(x<x r). Using xr =




{Pr(x ≥ xr | y)[E (x | x ≥ xr)] + Pr(x<x r | y)xr} (32)





{Pr(x ≥ xr | y)[E (x | x ≥ xr) − xr]+xr} (33)
Recall that in the above, Pr(x ≥ xr | y) is in fact conditionalon the woman’s own














(x − xr)dQ(x,m |   me)






(x − xr)dQ(x,m |   me) can be integrated by parts (this is done using a
change of variable technique; denoting Q(x,m |   me)b yG(x), and using dG(x)=









[1 − Q(x,m |   me)]dx + R(  me). (35)
Derivation of (17):
Recall that the expectation of the value function (from (5) in stage 2 is
EV  me (m)=EM max
 
ϕ  me (m),R(  me)
 
. (36)
We begin by re-writing (4):
(α(  me)+r)R(  me)=α(  me)EM max
 
ϕ  me(m),R(  me)
 
(37)
The RHS of the above equation can be shown to equal
α(  me)
 





P(ϕ  me(m) ≥ R(  me))E
 
ϕ  me(m)|ϕ  me(m) ≥ R(  me)
  
Therefore, eq(37) can be written as:




ϕ  me(m)|ϕ  me(m) ≥ R(  me)
 
− R(  me)
 
.







ϕ  me(m) − ϕ  me(mr)
 







ϕ  me(m) − ϕ  me(mr)
 
d(1 − F(m |   me)).






[1 − F(m |   me)]ϕ
 
  me(m)dm. (38)
Substituting (15) in the above yields
23R(  me)=
α(  me)
r(r + λ(  me))
m  
ϕ−1
  me(R(  me))















which is (17) in the text of the paper.
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